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Abstract
Finland has the operational capability to make airborne gamma ray measurements in
emergency situations. The original purpose of airborne radiation mapping was to deter-
mine hazardous areas containing radioactive fallout after nuclear accidents or the use of
nuclear weapons. Regular exercises are held annually to keep operational functionality at
high level for this purpose.
The knowledge and achieved practice can easily be extended to use in international
radiation monitoring campaigns. The presented guidelines are based on Finnish know-
how, but it is not limited to use with Finnish equipment.
The report describes the method and its usability in detecting the chain of nuclear materi-
al production using aerial gamma ray measurements. Technical details are given on how
to manage measurement tasks, and information is also given on what is detectable from
an aeroplane and how it is detected.
The ability to use the airborne detection system has been tested to reveal the use of
undeclared nuclear material. Various scenarios were considered with which to reveal
clandestine nuclear material production, enrichment, and nuclear waste trails. The exer-
cises arranged during this programme show that it is possible to reveal such clandestine
activities.
The fixed-wing gamma measurement technique developed under this contract is ready for
detecting significant amounts of nuclear material efficiently and cost effectively. Large
areas can be screened to find suspicious sub-areas for more accurate inspection. The
approximate cost of screening is USD 17.4 per square kilometre.
KETTUNEN Markku (Defence Forces Technical Research Centre), NIKKINEN Mika (STUK).
GammaJet—Fixed-wing gamma survey for the detection of radioactive materials. Finnish support
to IAEA. STUK-YTO-TR 185. Helsinki 2002. 15 pp + Appendices 23 pp.
Keywords: airborne gamma measurement, fallout, WAES, orphan source, hidden nuclear activities
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After the accident that occurred at the Chernobyl
nuclear power plant and the subsequent fallout
received in Finland, the Finnish national emer-
gency preparedness officials made the decision to
develop high-level tools further for the measuring
and mapping of large-scale fallout situations. The
primary officials responsible for this work were
the Finnish Radiation Safety Authority (STUK)
and the Defence Forces (DF). Several improve-
ments were made in the nation-wide radiation-
monitoring network to guarantee quick response
in any fallout situation. The decision was also
made to develop an operational system for meas-
uring airborne gamma rays. The main goal of the
airborne system was to guarantee its functionality
and fulfil the needs to map large fallout areas
rapidly. The development of the airborne measure-
ment system was put in the hands of the Defence
Forces.
Airborne gamma ray spectrometry is a power-
ful technique for rapidly and sensitively mapping
the wide range of artificial radionuclides resulting
from nuclear accidents. The measurement efficien-
cy of the airborne system to scan large contami-
nated areas is unique. The complex mixture of
radionuclides can be analysed with a sensitive
detector. Maps of the fallout pattern are essential
for planning emergency responses and for restrict-
ing the sale of agricultural produce. The capability
for quick response to extraordinary situations is
the key factor to minimizing the associated com-
mercial loss and human suffering. All these facts
together provide airborne radiation measurements
with the support needed to maintain and develop
the measurement system in Finland [1–7].
Airborne gamma measurement can also be
used to find lost point sources. When the task is to
locate lost point sources, the strategy for the
measurement differs from that for fallout map-
ping. Shorter integration times and few statistics
1 Introduction
play a major role. Because of the short integration
time, one important detector property is radiation
detection efficiency, another is the long-term sta-
bility of the measurement system, and a third is
the energy resolution of the detector. The impor-
tance of these three properties is of course de-
pendent on the physical properties of the nuclide
in the lost point source. Because the background
radiation level is low for low-flying aircraft and it
differs essentially from artificial radiation at point
sources, the possibility to differentiate anomalies
from natural terrestrial background is extremely
good.
One important goal for a task locate a point
source is to reveal undeclared nuclear activities.
For example, the essential task for producing a
nuclear bomb is to obtain enough nuclear material
for the enrichment or reprocessing process. To get
enough uranium for the bomb, mining-related
processes must be carried out. These kinds of
activities leave a trail in the environment, and
airborne measurements can trace it.
Airborne radiation measurements can be used
for other purposes as well. One scenario would be
a terrorist action in which radioactive substances
are distributed over populated areas. Such a sce-
nario can be accomplished through the following
means:
• Attack on a nuclear power plant, research
reactor, or other facility containing large quan-
tities of radioactive substances. For example, a
hijacked aeroplane can be used as a penetrator.
• Traditional explosions surrounded by radioac-
tive substances, for example, stolen radioactive
sources can be exploded or burned in the neigh-
bourhood of a strategic site as so-called “dirty
bombs”.
• Radioactive waste can be spilled on an area
producing food or other substances needed for
daily living, for example, on fields, the sea, a
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community water supply, the paper production
chain or other similar sites.
• A hijacked aeroplane can be loaded with radio-
active substances and dropped in the middle of
a populated area.
All of these scenarios call for rapid aerial survey
and the capability to report close to real time for
further action plans. It must be noted that the
threat itself can be used as a weapon, and in some
cases we need to be able to prove that the claimed
release of radioactive substances is not true. For
example, such a rumour can have a severe psycho-
logical impact on a population. The economic im-
pact can be large if the correct information is not
released in a timely manner. Hardly anyone is
willing to eat fish if a radiation terrorism attack
has been assumed to occur on an unknown area at
sea, for example. In extreme cases, a terrorist
group could manufacture a nuclear weapon of
their own or steal one and explode it in a city. No
matter how successful this kind of explosion is,
rapid survey is needed to determine the hazard-
ous area.
The focus of these fixed-wing measurement
tests in 1999 and 2000 was on providing guide-
lines for carrying out practical field measure-
ments over large areas under hard conditions. In
the autumn of 2001, the nuclear emergency exer-
cise “Barents Rescue 2001 LIVEX” provided a
valuable possibility to compare the properties of
large and medium-size sodium iodine detectors.
Particularly the "Gamma Search Cell" part of this
exercise concentrated on revealing lost point
sources. The results of the participating teams will
be published by Nordiska Sällskapet för Strålsky-
dd (NKS) [8].
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The airborne gamma measurement system con-
sists principally of the following four parts: gam-
ma ray detector, analyser, computer and software.
The platform of measurement is very challenging
when compared with that for laboratory measure-
ments or even with that of car-borne measure-
ments. The reliability of all four components must
be much higher. Especially the detector specifica-
tions must fulfil the requirements of the special
measurement environment. Due to the high speed
of the aircraft, the amount of collected data is
2 Description of airborne measurement systems
huge. The computer systems must be capable of
handling the data so that important spectra are
saved on disk for post-processing. The programs
must be efficient enough to process the data in
real time, and reprocessing must be carried out
easily.
The measurement data are usually presented
in some form of a digital map. For fallout mapping,
online triangle modelling is usually accurate
enough. Post-processing and ground level model-
ling are needed when point sources are located.
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Finland has a highly rated operational capability
to execute fixed-wing gamma measurements for
national security reasons; this preparedness was
primarily built for fallout mapping purpose. For
this security reason, the preparedness level is kept
high through regular exercise. Changes in the se-
curity environment have emphasized the need to
develop tools for use in emergency preparedness
situations other than pure fallout mapping. The
option to locate a point source must put more
weight on development because it can offer many
benefits in the foreseeable future.
The Defence Forces’ airborne gamma spectrom-
etry equipment consists of an Hyper Pure Germa-
nium (HPGe) detector (relative efficiency 70% at
1332 keV) to measure nuclide-specific ground con-
tamination. A 6×4 inch sodium iodine detector
(NaI) was also installed on the rack to help find
lost radioactive point sources. The spectroscopy
system can be installed in both a helicopter and a
jet plane. It has also been installed in commercial
aircraft. The measurement results are analysed
immediately, and the system produces fallout pat-
terns in real time for one chosen nuclide on either
a vector or a raster map. The positioning is based
on world-wide reachable Global Positioning Sys-
tem (GPS) service, but Russian GLObal NAviga-
tion Satellite System (GLONASS) position satel-
lites can be also used. For navigation in Finland, it
is possible take advantage of the DGPS service
provided by the Finnish Broadcasting Company,
which utilizes the Radio Data System (RDS) chan-
nel to obtain position accuracy within 2 metres.
The correction signal can be picked up nation-
wide on the FM transmitter network.
The fallout maps for each important nuclide
are produced using the MicroStation program with
TerraModeler application. This application soft-
ware can produce the map in real time for one
nuclide, and for other important nuclides these
fallout maps can be produced quickly after the end
of the measurement. The measured spectra and
the fallout maps must be sent as quickly as
possible to the civil defence authorities. After the
aeroplane lands, the cellular telephone data con-
nection can also be used to send data to the
national emergency database. The map system
allows the use of vector and raster maps.
Detection limits for the airborne monitoring
system in case of fallout
The flight parameter influences the required
detection limit with the following decreasing or-
der: altitude, speed, and acquisition time. The
detection limits (15 seconds integration time, uni-
form distribution and 70% germanium (HPGe)
detector) for a helicopter flying at an altitude of 60
metres are:
Gamma source 241Am 57Co 137Cs 60Co
Energy [keV] 59.5 122.4 661.6 1332.5
[kBq/m2] 25.3 3.30 1.81 0.65
These values have been calculated using MDA cal-
culation formulas by Currie [9].
3 Flight measurement system for Finnish
emergency preparedness purposes “GammaJet”
Figure 1. The Finnish Air Force Learjet 35A/S used
for radiation monitoring. Photo by FDF /Jyrki
Laukkanen.
S T U K - Y T O - T R  1 8 5
9
With minor preparation, the equipment can be
used all over the world in cold winter conditions,
as well as in oppressive summer environments.
In several exercises, for example, in Interna-
tional Nuclear Exercise (INEX); INEX-2-FIN [10]
and Barents Rescue 2001 [8] international exercis-
es, the described system has proved its capability
to produce radiation maps reliably and rapidly.
At the end of the exercise, the Defence Forces
made fallout mapping of the area northeast of
Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) and produced a fallout
map of the area (Fig. 2). This measurement was
done from a helicopter, and 370 square kilometres
were measured in 1 hour and 17 minutes. The
final fallout map was sent 41 minutes after the
plane landed via a GSM data connection to a
SVO+ server at 1746 local time.
Figure 2. Aerial 137Cs mapping of an INEX-2-FIN exercise done from a helicopter between at 1525 and
1642 local time. The average line spacing was about 2.5 kilometres. The base map is a digital vector map
to allow for easy scaling.
The procedure for making aerial measurements in
emergency situations is, in general, the following:
The Radiation Safety Authority (STUK) requests
the headquarters of the Armed Forces to execute a
radiation reconnaissance flight above a certain
area. The headquarters gives the order to carry
out the task to the air forces or land forces. The
aeroplane or the helicopter is supplied on its home
base. At the same time, the Defence Forces Techni-
cal Research Centre prepares the measurement
system, and the measurement platform and sys-
tem are combined at the Pirkkala air base. During
workhours this procedure takes 2 hours. At the air
base, the installation takes no longer than 2 hours
(usually 1 hour). After the survey the results are
sent to the headquarters of the Defence Forces
and also to STUK.
10
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The project includes three case studies; two were
carried out in Otaniemi and one at the time of the
Barents Rescue exercise in Sweden. The aim was
to compare the capability of the detectors to find
point sources when advanced post-processing and
ground level modelling are combined with gamma
measurements.
4.1Otaniemi 1999 and 2000
The source term, natural uranium, was placed in
the geometry described in Appendix 1. The back-
ground radiation level of the Otaniemi cape is very
diverse because of the topography, uranitic rocks,
and large buildings placed on the cape. A Finnish
Air Forces Learjet 35 was used. The speed of the
aircraft over the test area was 450 km/h. The flight
height was 100 metres, and the flight line spacing
was 50 metres—first two 35 metres. Two medium-
size NaI (1.83 litres) detectors and any other
equipment needed for the measurements were in-
stalled in the cabin. The results showed that the
source could be determined using these detectors.
An accurate description of the test is presented in
Appendix 1.
In the year 2000 the arrangements were simi-
lar. The speed and altitude were the same, and the
line spacing was 25 metres. The source term was
the same natural uranium placed with somewhat
more open geometry. HPGe and NaI (6.83 litres)
detectors were used. The results showed that the
large NaI detector was not stable during the
measurement, and the increased statistics did not
offer the benefit of locating the source. The very
few high-quality HPGe counts were more useable
in pinpointing the source. An accurate description
of the test is presented in Appendix 1.
4.2Barents Rescue 2001
The goal of the Barents Rescue 2001 exercise was
to find and characterize as many lost point sources
as possible in a limited amount of time. Five differ-
ent measurement areas (each 10 km2) were used
during the exercise, as were 50 minutes of flight
time over every area. Medium-size NaI (1.83 li-
tres) and HPGe detectors were installed on a com-
mercial Swedish helicopter. An accurate descrip-
tion of the test exercise is presented in Appen-
dix 1. The exercise involved 12 airborne search
teams from 7 countries. The good spectral quality
of the rather small detectors allowed most of the
hidden sources to be found using the advanced
post-processing technique. Altogether 13 of the 23
hidden sources were revealed. This is a top-quality
result for the Barents Rescue exercise. Only the
Danish team succeeded to find the same number
of sources. The complete list of sources used in the
exercise is also given in Appendix 1.
4 Detection capability case studies
S T U K - Y T O - T R  1 8 5
11
5.1Detectors
5.1.1 Detector properties
Sodium iodine detectors are based on the use of
scintillation material and a photomultiplier tube.
The light production in active material of the de-
tector changes as the temperature changes. The
photomultiplier gain is sensitive to temperature.
These two characteristics combined cause the de-
tector energy response to be unstable at fluctuat-
ing environmental temperatures. HPGe detectors
are cooled by liquid nitrogen at a very low operat-
ing temperature, and environmental temperature
changes do not affect the energy response. Me-
chanical vibration and acceleration can also affect
the detector energy response. The vibration can be
dampened, but long-lasting acceleration cannot be
avoided. The HPGe detector is not sensitive to ac-
celeration, but photomultiplier tubes are. The ac-
celeration can shift the dynodes inside the photo-
multiplier tube and therefore change the gain.
Large NaI detectors with a large photomultiplier
tube are more vulnerable to this kind of environ-
mental stress.
5.1.2 Detectors used at Otaniemi and the
Barents Rescue exercise
In the experiments, one large and two medium-
size NaI detectors and also one hyper pure HPGe
detector were tested. The basic properties of these
detectors are listed in Table I.
The 6×4 inch medium-size NaI detector is used for
purposes of preparedness in Finland, as also is the
70% HPGe detector. The large NaI detector is
property of the Geological Survey of Finland, and
it was borrowed for the exercise.
5.1.3 Comparison of the large and
medium-size detectors (NaI)
The outer cover of the large detector was king-size
due to the good heat insulation structure, and the
installation of this detector was complicated be-
cause the space in the jet plane was very limited.
For medium-size detectors the installation was
more convenient.
5.1.4 Conclusions regarding detectors
From a practical point of view the medium-size
detector is much easier to handle and install. The
large sodium iodine detector was not robust
enough to produce undistorted high-quality spec-
tral data during real missions in demanding cir-
cumstances.
5.2Real mission requirements
for detectors
5.2.1 Operating environment
The real mission environment is very challenging.
Acceleration, vibration, and temperature gradi-
ents can affect detector stability. A long mission
duration also makes special demands on detector
usability and reliability factors.
5 Equipment and procedures
Table I. Technical data of the detectors. The shape of the detectors was cylindrical.
Detector Size (diameter × height) Relative efficiency @1.17 MeV compared 3×3 inch NaI detector
1,83 litres NaI 6×4 inch
152×102 mm
540% Teledyne Brown Engineering Model S-2146 u/s and Scionix Holland 
BV 152 AS 102/5E-XQ
6.83 litres NaI 11.5×6 inch 
292×102 mm
1000% 
70% HPGe 69.7×76.9 mm 70% EG&G OrtecGEM-60200-P
12
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With the large detector the bigger and heavier
parts inside the photomultiplier may make it more
vulnerable for the disturbances (acceleration, vi-
bration) generated by aerial environments. The de-
crease of FWHM during the measurement and the
changes of the used large NaI detector during en-
ergy response makes it impossible to benefit from
the increased statistics offered by large detector.
5.2.2 Minimum requirements
The detectors must be stable against environmen-
tal temperature changes, acceleration and vibra-
tion; it is essential keep the spectral quality ac-
ceptable for post-processing to get good ground
level model.
5.2.3 Conclusions
Medium-size NaI detectors are the most usable
under field circumstances; their detection efficien-
cy is better than that of HPGe detectors, and there
is no need to cool them. The use of medium-size
NaI detectors makes a long campaign more practi-
cable to carry out with success.
5.3 Global positioning devices
GPS navigators were used to determine the posi-
tion on earth. For this purpose, a dual-channel
(GPS and GLONASS) positioning device was used.
This device outputs data in NMEA 0183 format,
which is commonly used for many applications on
naval and airborne fields. GPS is owned by the
United States, whereas GLONASS uses a Russian
satellite network. Both of these systems are non-
scrambled and freely usable for contemporary pur-
poses.
The positioning system is rather accurate, the
average accuracy ranging from 5 to 10 metres,
which is rather good for airborne measurements.
If more accurate positioning is needed, a differen-
tial system can be used to remove uncertainties in
the positioning. In some countries radio band-
width receivers are used on a commercial basis to
transform corrected positioning; a new feature is
available to make the correction directly via satel-
lites. This correction is not yet available globally.
One adjustment was made for the GPS data
handling. The dynamic correction factor was
checked more carefully for the Barents rescue
exercise. Earlier a static correction was made to
Figure. 3. Computer data-processing dependencies
and data exchange format.
SAMPO, Data
acquisition,
analysis (flight)
SAMPO, re-
processing of ROI
data (ground)
GMLINT,
modeller for source
location (ground)
MicroStation,
Real time
mapping,
presentationSVO+SVO+
SVOPP
SVO+
Figure. 4. SAMPO measurement window during the data acquisition. This was a test in the laboratory
using large sources. A whole spectrum and four regions of interest are shown in graphic form. Large
sources can be detected, identified and located directly using this feature.
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the positioning, which was based on old informa-
tion from previous exercises. Now the dynamic
factor was set with an accuracy of 0.1 seconds
instead of 1 second, which improved the position-
ing accuracy by more than 60 metres. This change
resulted in more accurate mapping in the post-
processing phase.
5.4 Computer infrastructure
In GammaJet application, the tasks of different
computers were dedicated in advance, each detec-
tor having one computer. One computer was han-
dling NaI data only, and one dealt with HPGe
data. Navigation and flight lining was a separate
application carried out by another NT computer.
During real jet-plane application all the comput-
ers are interconnected via the Ethernet network.
One additional computer can be set up to draw 3D
information in a mapping system based on Micro-
Station CAD software.
Post-processing computers do re-analyses of
data on NT computers supplied with SAMPO
software. The result (energy window and position
information) is transferred to a Linux computer,
where data is modelled for ground level mapping.
Output is a bitmap that can again be included in a
mapping system based on vector maps.
5.5 Data processing
The data acquisition system was based on SAMPO
software [11,12, 13]. SAMPO 4 takes the data from
MCA and GPS receivers and couples them togeth-
er. During the data acquisition, some analyses are
already done for the data; four predefined regions
of interest on the spectrum are investigated and
visualized on what is called a rainbow or waterfall
display. (See Figure 4.) Analyses can also contain
peak detection and single peak quantification
based on energy information. In a wide-range fall-
out analysis in which 1-minute data collection can
be used, a full spectrum analysis, including peak
location, peak area fitting and radionuclide identi-
fication, can be added.
Post-processing may contain analyses of the
original raw data that resemble those during the
acquisition. In the post-processing phase the user
can change the regions of interest or use different
kinds of graphic filters to enhance the visibility of
anomalies detected in the gamma flux by the
detector.
GMLINT software is used to model the data to
produce a smooth output of the map. The idea of
GMLINT is to determine the most probable data
between the sparse grids developed by the meas-
urement points. Different smoothing filters can be
used for the fallout and source location to enhance
the visibility of the sources or to make a more
average map of the wide fallout area. Sample fig-
ures of the GMLINT results are shown in Appen-
dix 1.
5.6 Mapping systems
Our mapping system is based on the MicroStation
platform. We have the following two applications
working with that platform: Tlink for a realtime
connection to the measurement results of the
measurement computer and Tmodel for modelling
and presenting the results on the base map. The
Tmodel uses a triangle for modelling the results,
and, if it is combined with Tlink, the measurement
data can be updated in real time on the map. Oth-
er surface models can also be used; for example,
the model post-processed by GMLINT [14] can be
presented on our map system. Vector or raster
maps can be used for base maps. Different map
projections can be converted to those supported by
our system.
5.7 Recommended airborne
measurement system
According our knowledge, the use of 2–4 medium-
size NaI detector units installed in the aeroplane
is recommended. Multiple units increase the total
reliability of the system and offer more flexibility
of choice between different scanning methods.
Figure 5. Schematic view of the recommended in-
struments needed for measurement campaigns. The
detector block can easily be multiplied.
Ethernet
Computer,
MicroStation mapping
Computer, NaI
detector, SAMPO
Computer, HPGe or
NaI detector, SAMPO
Computer, Post-
processing, GMLINT
GPS
NaI detector
package
• MicroNomad
• 6×4” NaI Detector
• Temperature
stabilization
• Internal and
external power
HPGe detector
package
• Nomad
• 70% HPGe
Detector
• Liquid nitrogen
cooling
• External power
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The field trials showed that it is possible detect a
significant amount of radioactive material using a
medium-size NaI detector and post-processing of
the recorded data.
To increase the probability of carrying out a
long-lasting campaign successfully, it is recom-
mended that 2–4 medium-size NaI units be used.
Ground level modelling (GMLINT) was found
to be important for the detection of anomalies.
Theoretical calculations can be used to deter-
6 Conclusions
mine the magnitude of unscattered photon flux for
the detector produced by combined homogeneous
radiation sources.
The aircraft platform must be suitable for
measuring the installation, and the attenuation
factor of the body structure must be as small as
possible.
A professional aeroplane operator is essential
for successful installation.
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Three case studies were carried out during this
project, two at Otaniemi in Finland in 1999–2000
and one in Sweden at the Barents Rescue 2001
exercise. The aim was to compare the capability of
detectors to find natural uranium point sources
when advanced post-processing was added to the
search. The detectors studied were 70% HPGe,
6.83 and 1.83 litres NaI.
1 Source description
These two source geometries did not differ much
with respect to flight measures. The 2000 geome-
try was somewhat less shadowed.
2 Field trials in Otaniemi, Finland
The source term, natural uranium, was used in
the aforementioned geometries. The background
radiation level of the Otaniemi cape is very di-
verse because of the topography, uranitic rocks,
and large buildings placed on the cape. A Finnish
Air Force Learjet 35 was used. All the detectors
and other equipment needed for the measure-
ments were installed in the cabin. The installa-
tions were inspected and accepted by the Finnish
Air Force Depot, which is the aviation authority
for military aeroplane installations.
APPENDIX 1 CASE RESULTS
Figure A1-2. Source term used in the December 2000 test. The elements were placed in a row to decrease
attenuation. The row was 15 metres long.
Figure A1-1. Source term used in the December 1999 test. The elements are in two beds.
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The aeroplane body was strengthened using
arched and longitudinal structures. Detector
placement had to be optimized to decrease the
attenuation of the aeroplane body.
2.1 Otaniemi exercise in 1999
The test was made using two medium NaI detec-
tors. The volume of the medium-size detector was
1.83 litres [diameter 152 mm, height 102 mm].
These two spectrometers worked independently.
The WGS coordinates in the form of the NMEA-
0183 norm were obtained from the internal com-
bined GPS-inertial navigation system of the Lear-
jet.
The flight altitude of the jet plane was 100
metres, and the speed varied between 400 and
Figure A1-3. An example of typical equipment installation accepted for continuous use in Finland. In this
case two HPGe-detectors were being installed. The first HPGe detector was not completely in place.
Figure A1-4. Planned flight lines used for the Otaniemi exercise in 1999.
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500 km/h, 460 km/h mainly being used. The first
two line spacings were 35 metres and the rest
were 50 metres. There was water on both sides of
the cape. The background is very difficult over the
cape. The source term is indicated in the figure
near the pond.
On the 1999 measurement, we found a signal
(1001 keV) from a uranium source during the
flight. Some signals were also detected from the
uranitic rocks. A signal (1461 keV) from naturally
occurring K-40 nuclide was also detected.
2.2 Otaniemi exercise in 2000
The measurement was conducted using one large
NaI detector and one 70% relative efficiency HPGe
detector. The large detector was a 6.83 litre [diam-
eter 292 mm, height 102 mm] NaI crystal used in
geological surveys of natural radiation. It had not
been used for some 20 years. These two spectrome-
ters worked independently. The WGS coordinates
were obtained in the form of the NMEA-0183 norm
from the internal combined GPS-inertial naviga-
tion system of the Learjet.
The placement of the equipment and operators
(in the test there were three operators on the
plane) were demanding for the test flight task
because of the very limited space in the cabin. We
finally found a functional arrangement that was
also acceptable to the aviation authority.
Figure A1-5. The planned and actual flight lines used in the Otaniemi 2000 exercise. The bigger red spot
on the left is a big chimney. The source term is the smaller red line on that same picture. The three lines at
the right were flown in opposite directions.
Figure A1-6. The Learjet 35 flying above the target and the installations in the cabin. The large “barrel”
at the front is the 6.83 litre (11.5 × 4 inch) NaI detector, the second detector, installed inside the cube, is a
70% HPGe detector and ahead of the operators are spectrometers and a computer.
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2.3 Detailed data analysis
The final results were evaluated from recorded
spectra. The SAMPO program was used for the
post-processing. Baseline reductions were carried
out using high-energy gamma flux correction
when recorded data quality made it possible to use
this advanced analysis method. The final results
were produced using the GMLINT program. The
GMLINT program uses point source characteris-
tics (including properties of material between the
source and detector) to locate the possible point
source.
2.3.1 Analysis of the Otaniemi 1999 spectra
The data from the two small NaI (6×4 inch) detec-
tors were similar. The data quality (inter alia peak
resolution) was the same as that measured under
fixed laboratory conditions. See the sum spectra in
Figure A1-7.
The quality of the recorded data allowed the
use of a small window in the regions of interest, as
well as advanced data post-processing with base-
line reduction using high-energy gamma flux cor-
rection.
Figure A1-7. Sum spectra of all the spectra recorded with one medium-size NaI (6×4 inch, 1.83 litres)
detector in the 1999 exercise. No broadening of the spectra can be detected. The discontinuation at the
beginning of the spectra is due to some error in the summing.
20
S T U K - Y T O - T R  1 8 5
APPENDIX 1 CASE RESULTS
2.3.2 Analysis of the Otaniemi 2000 spectra
Table A1-I shows the properties of the medium
6×4 inch NaI and large 11.5×4 inch NaI detector.
2.4 Remarks on the Otaniemi exercises
Since the measurement signal was assumed to be
at the top of a natural signal in this case, the
signal-to-noise ratio caused the 1.83 litre detector
to be better than the 6.83 litre detector. The sig-
nal-to-noise ratio is proportional to the square root
of FWHM, and the higher efficiency of the large
detector also causes extra impairment, especially
when the FWHM is poor. K-40 1461 keV gammas
give pulses in the background under the 1001 keV
peak, and the detection limit decreases.
When compared with data from the 1999 exer-
cise, the sum spectra had a very smooth peak
shape. In September 1998 we sent an interim
report, “Fixed Wing Survey, Gamma Detector
Comparison”, which describes the dependency of
the minimum detectable activity on the square
root of the ratio of the resolution of the compared
detectors. The big difference between the behav-
iour of the large and middle-size detectors in the
actual measurement situation was the key factor
leading to the recommendation of the medium size
detector in execution of the wide area measure-
ment campaign.
In geological surveys the detector can be stabi-
lized using naturally occurring radionuclides like
K-40 or Pa-234m. The aeroplane used for geologi-
cal surveys in Finland is a small plane equipped
with a twin propeller motor; the flight speed is
about 200 km/h. Therefore the measurement envi-
ronment differs completely from that of jet-based
measurements. The speed of a jet plane is about
500 km/h; at this speed the stress caused by
acceleration forces is significantly larger.
Since the measurements must be done with
short intervals to reach adequate local accuracy,
the information per measured square metre is
much lower with the jet-plane measurement sys-
tem.
If the target country has low background in
respect to naturally occurring radionuclides, auto-
mated stabilization cannot be used.
Table A1-I. Detector properties.
Detector size
FWHM in the laboratory (%) 
@661 keV
FWHM on the field (%) @661 
keV
Relative efficiency @1.17 
MeV compared 3×3 NaI
0.35 litres 6 100%
1.83 litres 4.7 5 540%
6.83 litres 11.7 22 1000%
Figure A1-8. Sum spectra of all the spectra recorded with the large NaI (11.5 × 4 inch, 6.83 litres) detec-
tor in the 2000 exercise. Clear broadening of the spectra can be detected.
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2.5 Post-processing of the Otaniemi spectra
The Otaniemi spectra were post-processed by the
GMLINT program.
Figure A1-9. Processed results from the 1999 measurements presented by the GMLINT program. The
data were obtained with the small NaI detector (A4). The data quality allowed advanced data processing.
2.6 Data interpretation
2.6.1 Interpretation of the 1999 results
Figure A1-10. Processed results from the 1999 measurements presented by the GMLINT program. The
data were obtained from the small NaI detector (A5). The data quality allowed advanced data processing.
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2.6.2 Interpretation of the 2000 results
It was noted that, during the 2000 measurements,
the detector gain was living ≥40 keV within the
energy range of Pa-234m. The accelerator forces
caused this variation. It caused the FWHM of the
peak at 1001 keV to be more than 100% higher
than in the laboratory environment. The measured
FWHM value of the large detector in the laborato-
ry environment was 11.7% at 661 KeV and during
the flight test it was 22%. As a result, the signal-
to-noise ratio was much worse than with the medi-
um-size detectors used in the previous test meas-
urements, and the source was less visible than in
the measurements performed in 1999.
See also Appendix 2: Calculated and detected
counts
The usefulness of the quality of the measured
data was also demonstrated using a “wide” window
on the HPGe detector spectra in the caesium
window. In addition to the low statistics of the
data, the source can also be found in the HPGe
data; see Figure A1-12.
Figure A1-11. Processed results from the 2000 measurements presented by the GMLINT program. The
data were obtained from the large NaI detector. The data quality did not allow for advanced data process-
ing.
S T U K - Y T O - T R  1 8 5
23
CASE RESULTS APPENDIX 1
Figure A1-12. High quality HPGe data presented by the GMLINT program. The low statistics did not
prevent the source from being found.
The 1999 results were more valuable for finding a
natural uranium source. The low background of
the flying jet plane enabled source detection from
a few “high quality” counts. The benefit of ad-
vanced data post-processing then becomes availa-
ble.
In 2000 we obtained more statistics but less
advantageous data. The large NaI detector was
more vulnerable to disturbance than the medium-
size detectors were. The few high-quality HPGe
counts were more useful for pinpointing the
source.
The comparison showed that the source is
possible to detect using a medium-size NaI detec-
tor at high speed at an altitude of 100 metres in a
jet plane. Flight lines must be followed accurately,
and some signals from the source can be detected
during the flight. The measurement data must be
post-processed after the flight to obtain the final
result.
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2.7 Barents Rescue 2001
The Barents Rescue 2001 LIVEX exercise was held
in the spirit of the Partnership for Peace to con-
duct exercises aimed at the search for and identifi-
cation of orphan radioactive sources over large ar-
eas.
2.7.1 Equipment used in the exercise
• 6×4 inch NaI detector + MicroNomad analyser
• 70% HPGe detector + DART analyser
• GPS GLONASS satellite navigator
• Three IBM ThinkPad laptop computers
• DC/AC  inverter
The listed instruments were installed in a Swed-
ish civilian helicopter (Eurocopter 350), which was
furnished by the organizer of the “Barents Rescue
2001” event, Appendix 5.
2.7.2 Methods of search
The helicopter flew continuously over the meas-
urement area at a height of 60 metres. Its speed
varied between 150 and 230 km/h. The lines were
spaced 100 meters apart. The spectrometers had
an integration time of about 1 second. Navigation
was primarily based on the GPS and MapPerfect
navigation programs. The aim was to provide cov-
erage that was as uniform as possible for the
whole measurement area within the limited flight
time.
A back seat was removed from the helicopter, and
the detectors were positioned in its place. The de-
tectors were protected against shock and vibra-
tion. Their location was chosen to minimize atten-
uation from incoming radiation. The attenuation
factor of the helicopter body was modelled using
point-source measurement.
2.7.3 Data analysis
The online detection of the source was based on
the online display of the SAMPO program. Sourc-
es were recognized using predefined regions of in-
terest (ROI) by checking for the sum spectra after
the measurement and then processing the data.
Data obtained with the HPGe and NaI detectors
were used to determine both the nuclide and the
activity of the orphan source. The SAMPO and
GMLINT programs were used for the post-process-
ing. The activity estimate was based on the ap-
proximation done by the GMLINT program. All
possible shielding was evaluated.
2.7.4 Results
The locations of hidden sources are presented at
the end of this appendix. During the exercise, all
five of the measurement areas were scanned. The
results were delivered to the organizer 1 hour af-
ter the helicopter landed. The co-ordinates were in
WGS-84.
Figure A1-13. An example of a SAMPO window. The last 360 spectra of the measurement are shown. K-40
can be easily identified, and two peaks of Co-60 point sources are visible.
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Table A1-II. Sources found in area A1.
Nuclide Coordinate (E) Coordinate (N) Activity Remarks
I-131 21°22'52.68" 65°41'29.60" 3 GBq Open source
Co-60 21°22'48.97" 65°41'45.86" 1 GBq Open source
Co-60 21°23'54.90" 65°42'08.50" 1.2 GBq Open source
Co-60 21°22'41.99" 65°40'53.75" 0.6 GBq Prop collimated
Cs-137 21°23'54.90" 65°42'09.00" 0.25 GBq Uncertain
Figure A1-14. A low-energy window showing both Co-60 and I-131 detections. The red point in the upper
left corner is an open top of a hill. All the A1 sources were found and identified correctly, with one extra Cs-
137 source being reported as “not absolutely certain”.
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Table A1-III. Sources found in area A2.
Figure A1-15. Somewhat uncertain sources within the area. The upper source was found outside the area.
It could also have been scattered radiation due to the hill that was being approached. The lower identified
point was close to the detection limit. Five A2 sources were missed, one Mo-99 source being found and
reported as Cs-137.
Nuclide Coordinate (E) Coordinate (N) Activity Remarks
Cs-137 21°36'33.00" 65°46'22.80" 1 GBq
Cs-137 21°35'45.51" 65°44'26.39" 0.5 GBq
S T U K - Y T O - T R  1 8 5
27
CASE RESULTS APPENDIX 1
Table A1-IV. Sources found in area A3.
Nuclide Coordinate (E) Coordinate (N) Activity Remarks
Co-60 21°38'26.16" 65°50'28.61" 2.5 GBq
– 21°39'19.08" 65°51'33.12" Fortress, added for further 
checking
Figure A1-16. Co-60 map of the area, with one clear source visible. The fortress on the top of the hill
produced a higher count rate. There may have been a source inside the building or the count rate may have
been higher due to the K-40 found in the concrete. An A3 Co-60 source was correctly found, and a bunker
was checked as a possible hidden source.
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Table A1-V. Sources found in area A4.
Figure A1-17. A Co-60 map of the area, with one clear source visible.
Nuclide Coordinate (E) Coordinate (N) Activity Remarks
Ir-192 21°31'23.16" 65°54'30.39" 2.7 GBq
Co-60 21°32'26.16" 65°54'21.31" 0.3 GBq
Cs-137 21°33'01.44" 65°54'30.39" 0.8 GBq
Cs-137 21°31'54.40" 65°53'10.75" 0.5 GBq Apparent activity, probably 
collimated
Figure A1-18. Total counts for area 4. One Ir-192 source is clearly visible. Four A4 sources were found and
identified correctly.
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Table A1-VI. Sources found in area A5.
Figure A1-19. Total counts found in area 5. Two strong sources were clearly visible. One additional high
count, a “hot spot”, was added for further inspection by the car teams. The flight lines were selected accord-
ing to visual navigation. Three A5 sources were found, and two were correctly identified.
Figure A1-20. Results of the measurements and the flight path plotted on the map in real time when the
PC network connected the computers. This map was produced after the measurements had been made.
Nuclide Coordinate (E) Coordinate (N) Activity Remarks
Co-60 21°25'11.10" 65°53'34.79" 2 GBq
Ir-192 21°26'26.70" 65°54'55.94" 2.9 GBq
– 21°26'39.30" 65°53'42.86" – Uncertain, added for further 
checking
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2.8 Remarks
The good spectral quality of the rather small de-
tectors allowed most of the hidden sources to be
found using the advanced post-processing tech-
nique. Altogether 13 of the 23 hidden sources were
revealed. This was a top-quality result of the
Table A1-VII. Point sources hidden in the exercise areas. For the airborne measurements, there was a
total of 23 hidden sources. Data are given for the Barents Rescue Gamma Search Cell. The aerial measure-
ment areas were A1…A5. The coordinates were in RT-90.
Barents Rescue exercise.
The source inventory given by the Barents
Rescue 2001 Gamma Search Cell is listed in Table
A1-VII. The airborne measurement areas are
codes “A1…A5”.
Nuclide Area Activity GBq Coordinate (E) Coordinate (N) Remarks
Co-60 A1 5 1756005 7298134 In wooden cage in gravel pit, shielded 
upwards with concrete blocks
I-131 A1 9.25 1756005 7299224 In shed, collimated with lead bricks 
upwards and to the west
Co-60 A1 5 1755956 7299830 In wooden cage at the end of the road
Co-60 A1 5 1756747 7300334 In wooden cage on the south side of 
the closed road
Co-60 A2 5 1764029 7307246 Inside the round concrete bunker
Co-60 A2 5 1764048 7307266 Inside the concrete bunker, collimated 
obliquely upwards
Mo-99 A2 3.1 1764844 7307031 Inside tracked vehicle cart
Mo-99 A2 18 1765350 7305451 In the house on the attic
Cs-137 A2 3×0.5 1763466 7306095 Inside tracked vehicle cart, level 
guards, directed upwards
Co-60 A2 3×0.02 1763466 7306095 Inside tracked vehicle cart, level 
guards, directed southwest
Co-60 A3 4×5 1766304 7316848 In storehouse 36, side shielded with 
lots of concrete blocks
Cs-137 A4 0.4 1760923 7321390 In red shed, in lead container, side 
shielded
Cs-137 A4 2.5 1760488 7323895 In “birdhouse”, shielded with a lead 
brick upwards
Ir-192 A4 13 1760488 7323933 Radiographic source in a tree
Co-60 A4 5 1761137 7323702 In concrete fire trench, covered with a 
steel plate and sand
Co-60 A4 5 1761117 7323744 In concrete fire trench, covered with a 
steel plate and sand
Cs-137 A4 1.3 1761442 7323932 In tracked vehicle cart, shielded 
upwards with concrete blocks
Cs-137 A4 1.9 1761559 7323941 In tracked vehicle cart, side shielded 
with transport container
Co-60 A5 40 1756869 7322034 Radiographic source in drainage drum 
under the road
Cs-137 A 2.6 1755733 7321627 In red shed, no shielding
Co-60 A5 2×5 1755750 7321686 n wooden cage, no shielding
Cs-137 A5 1.9 Chancing Chancing In car cart moving along the roads, 
shielded to all sides
Ir-192 A5 46 1756402 7324293 Radiographic source below boulder
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1 The evaluated examination and
calculations for the Otaniemi source
Flight measurements and a sub-part of a signifi-
cant amount of metallic uranium (Otaniemi).
The purpose of the measurements was to test
the ability to detect anomalies like excess urani-
um at the ground level. The measurement results
have been analysed, and we found that there were
substantial uncertainties in the quantitative re-
sults. The most important issue was to detect the
anomalies. Therefore, a jet plane was used to
screen the landscape, the data were recorded, and
the greatest anomalies were prompted during the
flight. The data were post-processed, and relative
radiation levels were displayed to find true hot
spots after every mission. The true absolute values
did not give us too much additional information
due to the large uncertainties.
The conclusions on the modelling, measurements,
and source calculations follow:
• The results still contained very low statistics.
The highest measured value was 13 counts (1-
second measurement), and therefore one sigma
error for this measurement was around 30%.
• The Otaniemi district represents the “worst
case” for this type of measurements. There are
large buildings and a high variation in the
ground level of uranium due to a high uranium
concentration in the bedrock (4–10 cps in the
window continuously). Background measure-
ments were not possible during the flight. We
could not determine the accurate gamma flux
from the sample empirically because we did not
know the baseline U/Th concentration at the
site without the source. We did assume a value
of 1000 keV ROI to be 6 cps (average value of
the district). This level can cause a 50% error in
the measured net values. The situation in the
target country was much easier due to the
more homogeneous natural radiation concen-
tration.
• The landscape varied due to 20-metre high
hills, which caused a difference of up to 35% in
the detected ground level of radiation flux
since the flying altitude had a variation be-
tween 100 and 80 metres.
• The radiation source was not homogeneous due
to inaccurate stacking; the unpredictable shad-
owing effect caused an error of some 10–20% in
the quantitative results.
2 Sodium iodine detector efficiency
Due to the low resolution of the NaI detector, for
single isotope identification, a wide region of inter-
est had to be selected. Therefore, other isotopes
could also be detected in the same region. Usually
this occurrence detrimentally affects the measure-
ment, but, if we are trying to detect any anomalies
and uranium ore or old processing waste, it actual-
ly helps the situation, since the source transmits
more gamma rays to the interesting energy win-
dow. This situation can be illustrated by uranium
measurements. Before the flight measurement, 54
kilogrammes of depleted uranium were measured
with a HPGe detector (Fig. A2-1a). The spectrum
showed many peaks also above 1001 keV.
Since the real measurements are performed at
distances of 100 metres, a large portion of these
higher energy gamma-lines is scattered and actu-
ally affects the 1001 keV region that we measured.
Therefore, the actual gamma flux in the 1001 keV
region was larger than for Pa-234m alone. The
spectra from the measurement of the natural
uranium bundle in Fig. A2-1b have a similar struc-
ture.
APPENDIX 2 CALCULATED AND DETECTED COUNTS
Markku Kettunen, Mika Nikkinen and Mika Juvela
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Figure A2-1a. HPGe spectra from 54 kilogrammes of depleted uranium.
Figure A2-1b. HPGe spectra from a uranium bundle of 30 kilogrammes.
• The efficiency of the NaI detector was not easy
to determine in this case. Normally, in gamma
spectrometry, the net area of a peak is used to
determine the efficiency of the detector. There-
fore the baseline (i.e., counts below the peak
that are not coming from the source) is re-
moved. When measuring a multi-line source
like ours at a distance of 100 metres, we did not
have any accurate method for reducing the
baseline. Therefore, we could use only the gross
pulses in the ROI window. We made an empiri-
cal test in the laboratory using a large uranium
source, and we found that the pure peak from
Pa-234m stands above the compton continuum,
which has the same number of pulses as the
peak itself. (See Fig. A1-2.) Furthermore, there
were nearly as many net pulses in the higher
energy channels, which are likely to scatter to
the 1001 keV ROI or more if the distance is 100
metres (the laboratory measurements were
performed at a distance of 4 metres). At the
same time part of the “real” 1001keV gammas
were scattered to the lower energies. Because
of these effects, we assumed that we could see
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2–3 times more gamma rays in the 1001 keV
ROI window than what is assumed for pure
peak efficiency.
• The efficiency is also dependent on the width of
the ROI. The more accurate results were
achieved by widening the window somewhat.
This step also increased the efficiency, since we
were actually detecting more scattered photons
from the source. The efficiency can be about
1.5–2 times better this way.
• If we add all of these uncertainties together, no
conclusion can be drawn about the quantitative
results, since we can have up to 3–400% uncer-
tainty in the absolute values.
• The method we used takes into account the
nature of low statistics, and it improves the
situation by averaging the radiation flux at
ground level with the correct physical model.
Using this method with the Otaniemi measure-
ments, we were able to pinpoint some anoma-
lies that would normally lead to onsite inspec-
tion of the region.
For detection capability, ground level source mod-
elling is important. In this manner, the maximum
amount of information can be used to display the
real hot spots on the ground. The GMLINT meth-
od used in the Otaniemi exercise utilizes all the
measurement points to re-build the lattice on
ground level. This way the gap between the flight
lines is filled, and more accurate results are
achieved because of better statistics.
With the use of these evaluated values of the
activity 1.24E+02 gammas (1001 keV) per second
per gram of natural uranium and the broad effi-
ciency concept, the calculations of the RADINT-
predicted count rate show a maximum value of 4
cps over the Otaniemi natural uranium source.
Figure A2-2. Twelve-hour measurement with a uranium sample after the background reduction. Note
that the Pa-234m peak is located above the high baseline continuum; the number of counts in the baseline
below the peak is about equal to the number of counts in the real peak. The measurement was performed at
a distance of 4 metres. At an altitude of 100 metres, the signal-to-baseline ratio is closer to 1:2 since all the
gamma rays above the 1001 keV have a tendency to come to lower energy due to the interaction with air.
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3 Conclusions
This exercise did prove that a sub-part of a signifi-
cant amount of a natural uranium source in this
type of lattice will emit enough gammas for detec-
tion by a 6×4 inch NaI detector. If we had eight
times more natural uranium (eight similar “heaps”
in the same place), we would detect 28 cps with
the same detector. This number of cps would defi-
nitely trigger the automated alarm during the
data acquisition. Therefore the position of the
source and the identification of the results would
be prompted for the measurement operator during
the flight.
Ground level modelling (GMLINT) was found
to be important for the detection of anomalies; this
is the way to reveal even a subpart of the signifi-
cant amount of uranium at ground level. To en-
sure detection capability, we need information on
the natural radiation background of the target
country. This information is required for the deter-
mination of the flight line distance. According to
the preliminary information, the background is
substantially lower than in Finland, which means
that a similar source is much more visible.
We should also emphasize the attenuation
measurements of the aeroplane body in relation to
point source detection. This step is also essential
with respect to the choice of the aeroplane.
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Background of airborne measurements are prima-
rily based on isotopes (natural and manmade)
found in the aeroplane or helicopter. The ground-
based background is usually based on natural iso-
topes on the ground (Th, U, Ac series). Ground-
based backgrounds can have large variations, de-
pending on the bedrock type and the amount of
vegetation on the bedrock or other source of radia-
tion. For example, the Chernobyl accident caused
a 137Cs background in part of Europe.
To determine the background in the aeroplane,
one can do the measurement above the sea or a
lake. One has to note that the background is
typical of an aeroplane; natural radioactive sub-
stances are usually difficult to remove if the plane
suffers from contamination by these substances.
Usually, the background is an essential factor
below 500 keV; above 1.2 MeV one can almost
ignore the effect of old contamination in the aero-
plane.
APPENDIX 3 BACKGROUND ESTIMATION ABOVE DIFFERENT AREAS
Figure A3-1. Background spectra 100 metres above the sea. Large-size NaI detector. Integration time 38.2
seconds. The spectra were measured from a jet plane.
Measured background spectra above
the sea or a lake
Background spectra measured from large and me-
dium-size detectors while above the sea follow. The
background spectra of the large detector are
shown in Fig. A3-1, and that of the medium-size
detector is presented in Fig. A3-2. The measure-
ment time was about 40 seconds. For comparison,
15-minute HPGe spectra measured from an MI-8
helicopter is shown in Fig. A3-3. All the spectra
were measured at a height of 100 metres.
In our case the larger NaI detector had an
essentially higher background in the 1001 keV
region of interest. This occurrence makes the
determination of uranium isotopes more difficult
with the larger detector.
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Figure A3-2. Background spectra 100 metres above the sea. Medium-size NaI detector. Integration time
35.4 seconds. The spectra were measured from a jet plane.
Figure A3-3. Background spectra 100 metres above lake Näsijärvi. HPGe detector. The spectra were meas-
ured from a helicopter. Integration time 900 seconds. The large “peak” near 120 keV is a consequence of
improper damping of helicopter vibration at the location of the detector.
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In addition to the information on pulse rates, it is
important to know how good the detection is in
the statistical sense. For this purpose, the follow-
ing two metrics are generally used: the error esti-
mate of the signal and the detection limit (i.e.,
signal/noise relationship). For the error estimate
in airborne measurements, classical Poisson sta-
tistics can be used, and the determination of the
APPENDIX 4 DETECTION LIMITS
Figure A4-1. In this figure, a map of a detected signal, the error for the signal and the detection limit is
shown. In the middle figure the 1-sigma error estimates are color-coded: green = 0–30%, yellow = 30–60%,
red = 60–90%, and black = more than 90%. In the rightmost figure the detection limit is color coded as
well; this map gives the Currie Lc (decision limit) at the 95% probability level: green = signal well over the
detection limit, yellow = signal 80–100% of the detection limit, red = signal 50–80% of detection limit,
black = signal improbable. As a result, these maps show confidence for the source found in the upper
corner of the flight area and good confidence for the small source found in the middle of the area. These
measurement data are based on Barents Rescue exercise; this is a picture of the area containing two
sources, for which only the Finnish team was able to find both sources.
error estimate is equal to the square root of the
pulses detected at one point. For detection limits,
the Currie-defined decision limit is the most use-
ful criterion. For these two variables, a separate
map can be determined simply by calculating
them from a modelled map, as seen in the follow-
ing figure.
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The radiation detection system was installed in a
Eurocopter 350 B 1 helicopter. The following units
were included in the installation:
1. Medium-size NaI detector (1.83 litres)
2. HPGe detector (70%)
3. Analyser MicroNomad
4. Analyser DART
5. GPS receiver Ashtech
6. Three laptop computers IBM
7. Static inverter Avionic Instruments
The Air Forces Aviation Technology Institute ac-
cepts these instruments for use in aircraft. The
electromagnetic disturbance of the devices was
measured and found to be acceptable. The me-
chanical construction was made for the installa-
tion by PirMec Rakenne Oy, which has a licence to
make plans for installation for aviation. The in-
APPENDIX 5 INSTALLATION INTO COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT
stallation construction included vibration and
shock dampening for the detectors. The helicopter
operator Norrlandsflyg inspected the installation
plans for use. Both the electrical and mechanical
connections were checked.
The placement of the detectors was chosen to
minimize the “shadow” from the body structure of
the helicopter from the gamma radiation coming
from land surfaces. The actual attenuation factor
was measured to downward directions using suit-
able point sources with computer-aided calcula-
tions. The determined attenuation factor of the
gamma radiation in the body structure of the
helicopter was acceptable.
The installation procedure required three trips
to Sweden to get the radiation measurement unit
installed properly into the commercial aircraft.
